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STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO MINORS:
THE NEW MEXICO COURT OF APPEALS' BALANCE
OF COMPETING STATE INTERESTS TO FAVOR
CHILDREN
CHARLOTTE TONETTA RICH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The State of New Mexico has a long history of protecting children, as evidenced
by the creation of the Children's Court and the Children's Code.' However, the state
also has a history of protecting its financial resources as well as the health of its
residents.2 All of these interests came into conflict when the state legislature
developed the Tort Claims Act3 and the Medical Malpractice Act.4 Unfortunately for
children, when passing both of these acts, legislators favored competing state
interests to create shortened limitation periods during which minors could file tort
actions. 5 The cost of this action was an encroachment upon a child's due process
right of access to the courts.6
In the sister cases Jaramillov. BoardofRegents of the University of New Mexico
Health & Sciences Center7 (Jaramillo1) andJaramillov. Heaton' (Jaramillo1), the
New Mexico Court of Appeals assessed the constitutional validity of the statutes of
limitations in each act as applied to the young minor. In 2001, the court ruled in
JaramilloI that, given the circumstances of the case, the statute of limitations found
in the Tort Claims Act 9 barred the minor's access to the courts. The statute was,
therefore, an unconstitutional violation of the minor's due process rights,'I as
guaranteed under the New Mexico Constitution" and U.S. Constitution. 2 In 2004,
* Class of 2006, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Browde, Kelly
Waterfall, and Kim Bannerman for their diligence, guidance, and encouragement in helping me with the writing
process. I would also like to thank my family for their endless support.
1. NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-1-1 to 32A-21-7 (1995); see infra note 21; see also Rider v. Albuquerque Pub.
Sch., 1996-NMCA-090, 1 13, 923 P.2d 604, 607 ("New Mexico...has a long tradition of interpreting laws carefully
to safeguard minors.").
2. See infra note 20.
3. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977).
4. NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976); see supra Part ll.B.
5. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. The statutory period is shorter than that provided under
NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975).
6. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 10, 23 P.3d
931,933; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 19, 100 P.3d 204, 209.
7. 2001-NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931.
8. 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204.
9. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977).
10. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 10, 23
P.3d at 933.
11. N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 18 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law; nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.").
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. The court in Jaramillov. Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico Health & Sciences Center, 2001NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931, did not state explicitly whether the state or federal constitution's Due Process Clause
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the court in Jaramillo II applied the Jaramillo I ruling to a similar statute of
limitations provision in the Medical Malpractice Act 3 and found the statute
unconstitutionally applied under the circumstances. 4 The court did not find the
statutes per se unconstitutional but, rather, created criteria for a case-by-case
analysis.' 5
This Note reviews the development of children's rights, the purpose and
objectives sought with the creation of the Tort Claims Act and the Medical
Malpractice Act, and New Mexico case precedent on the subject.' 6 Then, the Note
outlines and analyzes the court of appeals' rationale in Jaramillo I and Jaramillo
I1.17 Next, the Note examines the criteria the court used when determining whether
minors could comply with the statutory requirements. 8 Lastly, the Note considers
whether parents should have a duty to pursue claims on their child's behalf.1'
H. BACKGROUND
JaramilloI and Jaramillo II sought an appropriate balance between protecting
children's legal rights and protecting other state interests.20 On one hand, the State
is concerned about protecting children 2' and their constitutional right of access to

applied to the constitutional challenge of the Tort Claims Act. One can conclude that the court was referring to both
state and federal constitutional due process rights because Tafoya v. Doe, 100 N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582 (Ct. App.
1983), a case upon which the court relied, referred to both state and federal constitutional rights. "All of these cases
reflect the view that one unable to comply with a notice requirement by reason of minority is protected by the
reasonableness requirements of the common law, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or
similar provisions in their state constitutions." Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 332, 670 P.2d at 586. In addition, the court in
Jaramillov. Heaton, relying heavily on its analysis in Jaramillo v. Board of Regents of the University of New
Mexico Health & Sciences Center, stated, "we begin with the notion that 'considerations of fairness implicit in the
Due Process Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions dictate....." 2004-NMCA-123, 8, 100
P.3d at 207 (quoting Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 541, 893 P.2d 428, 437 (1995)).
The presence of a federal constitutional ruling means the case is reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-41 (1983). But absent some federal law question, the Supreme Court has
no power to review state court judgments based on a state constitutional ruling. Id. at 1040-41. If there is ambiguity
in a state court opinion as to whether the issue presented was a state or federal question, the Supreme Court will
assume a federal constitutional question exists. Id. The Court makes this assumption to ensure uniformity in the
federal law and to allow state courts to retain autonomy by not having to answer questions from the Supreme Court.
Id.
13. NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976).
14. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 1 1, 100 P.3d 204,206.
15. See id.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part IV.A-B.
18. See infra Part V.C.
19. See infra Part V.D.
20. The State's interests include not litigating stale claims or spending unnecessary funds for legal defense.
See Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 537, 893 P.2d 428, 433 (1995). The State is also interested in retaining
physicians by providing affordable medical malpractice insurance; this will help to ensure the availability of health
care workers for New Mexico residents. See id. at 539, 893 P.2d at 435; Jaramillo v. State, 111 N.M. 722, 725, 809
P.2d 636, 639 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The purpose of a limitations period is to establish repose and, with respect to claims
against the state, to protect the state's resources from stale claims."); James L. Isham, Annotation, Local
Government Tort Liability: Minority as Affecting Notice of Claim Requirement, 58 A.L.R. 4TH 402 (2003).
21. Through the development of the New Mexico Children's Code (the Code), NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-I-1
to 32A-21-7 (1995), the state legislature illustrated the importance of protecting children and children's interests.
The Code attempts to balance the needs of the State with the needs of children, specifically, protection of children's
legal rights. NMSA 1978, § 32A-1 -3 (1995); INST. OF PuB. LAW, UNIV. OF N.M. SCH. OF LAw, NEW MExIco CHILD
WELFARE HANDBOOK, 1-1 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE HANDBOOK]. The Code's primary purpose
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courts. 22 On the other hand, the State has to protect its financial resources and the
health of its residents.23 When making its rulings in both Jaramillo I and Jaramillo
11, the court, when interpreting the constitutionality of the laws, considered the
history and the current status of the competing interests. This section looks briefly
at the advancement of children's rights as well as the development and purpose of
the Tort Claims Act and the Medical Malpractice Act.
A. ConstitutionalRights of Children
In early common law, children did not have individual, protected constitutional
rights.2 Children were legally recognized as their parents' property, with parents
having absolute authority over children until they reached the age of majority,
generally eighteen. 5 Thus, children's rights were subjugated to those of their
parents.26 During the second half of the nineteenth century and continuing into the
twentieth century, "American jurisprudence gradually began to recognize that

is to ensure parties "a fair hearing and [that] their constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and enforced."
NMSA 1978, § 32A-I-3(B) (1999). The Code's "paramount concern" is "[tihe child's health and safety." NMSA
1978, § 32A-1-3(A) (1999). The Code provides for the protection of children's interests in abuse and neglect cases,
as well as in delinquency cases.
In abuse and neglect cases, the court is obligated to provide a guardian ad litem to protect the best interests of
the child because children are unable to do so themselves. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-10(C) (2005) ("No officer or
employee of an agency that is vested with the legal custody of the child shall be appointed as guardian ad litem of
or attorney for the child."). When children are involved in abuse and neglect cases, the court focuses on the best
interests of the children and organizes a treatment plan around the children's needs. NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-19(B)
(1997). The best interest of the child is "a lens through which the entire proceeding should be viewed." CHILD
WELFARE HANDBOOK, supra, at 3-1.
The legislature developed the Children's Court, which specializes in issues related to children and their specific
needs. The development of an entire court system separate from adult courts emphasizes the State's concern and
awareness of children's special rights, needs, and interests.
In order to further protect children's interests and rights, the legislature provided for Court Appointed Special
Advocates (CASAs) to "assist[] the court in determining the best interests of the child by investigating the case and
submitting a report to the court." NMSA 1978, § 32A-1-4(D) (2005). CASAs are community volunteers who
represent the child's best interest and needs to the Children's Court Judges. Rule 10-121 NMRA. Additionally, the
legislature developed Citizen Review Boards (CRBs) through the Citizen Substitute Care Review Act, NMSA 1978,
§ 32A-8-1 (1993). The CRBs consist of volunteers who "provide a permanent system for independent and objective
monitoring of children placed in the custody of the department." NMSA 1978, § 32A-8-2 (1993).
The Code also offers special protection for children in state custody. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14 (2003). The
New Mexico Supreme Court explained that when enacting section 32A-2-14 of the Code, the legislature intended
to protect minors in the delinquency system by providing rights greater than the Miranda rights. Id.; State v. Javier
M., 2001-NMSC-030, 33 P.3d 1; Maria E. Touchet, Note, InvestigatoryDetention of Juveniles in New Mexico:
Providing GreaterProtection than Miranda Rights for Children in the Area of Police Questioning-Stateof New
Mexico v. Javier M., 32 N.M. L. REv. 393, 404 (2002). The Code's delinquency statute "imposes a legal
presumption that all statements made by thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds are inadmissible." Touchet, supra (citing
NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14(F) (2003)). In addition, children under the age of thirteen cannot be fingerprinted without
a court order. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14(I) (2003). It is important to note that, even though protected, children can
receive adult sentences and face harsh punishment in the juvenile justice system. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20
(2005).
22. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975) (allowing for minors to pursue a cause of action once the minor is
more capable).
23. See supra note 20.
24. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 20 (2000).
25. Id. at 14, 20.
26. Id. at 20.
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children hold constitutional rights. ' 27 In 1899, the first juvenile court was developed
to focus on and address issues of law specific to children. 8
In the 1920s, the U.S. Supreme Court began acknowledging that children have
constitutional rights separate from their parents' rights.29 Children now have a
bundle of rights,3" including access to the courts.3 Common law has established
court access as a property right protected by the Due Process Clause.32
Given the common-law developments acknowledging children's constitutional
rights, specifically access to the court system, state legislatures have chosen to help
protect this right by providing children ample opportunity to pursue their own
causes of action.33 When doing so, state legislatures have been confronted with the
conflicting interests of a child's right to pursue a cause of action and other legitimate
state interests.34 In New Mexico, legislators have balanced the competing interests
differently, depending on the parties involved.35 For example, the state legislature
allows claims against a private tortfeasor for a cause of action arising while the
plaintiff is a minor to be brought until the plaintiff's nineteenth birthday.36 However,

27. Id. at 20, 26.
28. Id. at 20. The settled national view through much of American judicial history was that "[flrom time
immemorial the status of a minor of tender years has been recognized in law to be different from that of one of more
mature years." McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 120 N.E. 476, 477 (111. 1918). This notion was "based upon the
well known fact of the incapacity of children of tender years, and [that children] are not held to the same
accountability as are adults." Id.
29. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), overruled in part by 912 F. Supp. 580 (1995), and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), were the first cases to "provide[] a foundation for ongoing reevaluation of
the status, rights and obligations of children." ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 24, at 20-25. Later cases
acknowledged and solidified children's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(holding that children have a right to religion); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that children
have a substantive right to equal education); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that children have
constitutional rights in public school admission); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the Bill of Rights is
not just for adults and that children have procedural constitutional rights).
30. See supranote 29. Also, "with the ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment in 1971, the Constitution
recognized political interests of children." Homer H. Clarke, Jr., Children'andthe Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 2. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment gave eighteen year olds the right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
Tafoya v.Doe, 100 N.M. 328, 331, 670 P.2d 582, 585 (Ct. App. 1983) ("It is axiomatic that
31. See, e.g.,
the constitutional provision of due process extends to protect that 'property' construed to be a vested right and that
generally an accrued right of action is a vested property right which may not be arbitrarily impinged.") (quoting
Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 180 N.W.2d 778, 781 (1970)).
32. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 853 (West 2003) ("if a person entitled to bring any of the
actions under sections 752 to 754 ... is a minor, mentally ill, imprisoned or without the limits of the United States
when the cause of action accrues, the action may be brought within the times limited herein after the disability is
removed."); IDAHO CODE § 5-213 (Michie 2004) ("The term during which such disability [being a minor] continues
is not deemed any portion of the time in this title limited for the commencement of such action.. .but such action
may be commenced.. .within the period of five years after such disability shall cease."); ALASKA STAT. §
09.10.140(a) (Michie 2004) ("(]f a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter is at the time the
cause of action accrues...under the age of majority,...the time of a disability ... is not a part of the time limit for the
commencement of the action.").
34. See supra note 20.
35. CompareNMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975), with NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977). Children under the
age of seventeen are afforded more time to file a claim under section 37-1-10 than under the Tort Claims Act,
section 41-4-15(A).
36. NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975) ("The times limited for the bringing of actions by the preceding
provisions of this chapter shall, in favor of minors and incapacitated persons, be extended so that they shall have
one year from and after the termination of such incapacity within which to commence said actions.").
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when a minor is suing the government under the Tort Claims Act37 or a doctor under
the Medical Malpractice Act,38 the legislature restricted the time in which minors
have to sue.
In the latter two statutes, the legislature included statutes of limitations that are
more restrictive for minors than those found under the statute of limitations for tort
claims. 39 More specifically, the Tort Claims Act provides a two-year statute of
limitations "except that a minor under the full age of seven years shall have until his
ninth birthday in which to file." ' The Medical Malpractice Act provides a threeyear statute of limitations "except that a minor under the full age of six years shall
have until his ninth birthday in which to file." ' 1 Although the legislature recognized
that young children needed extra time to file claims, overall, the statute of
limitations for minors was shortened.42 As a result of this legislative act, children's
access to the court system was restricted.
B. BriefHistory of the Tort Claims Act and the Medical MalpracticeAct
The Tort Claims Act and the Medical Malpractice Act were enacted during the
same year in an effort to protect state interests. 43 The legislature enacted the Tort
Claims Act in response to the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Hicks v.
State,44 which abolished sovereign immunity in New Mexico. 45 In Hicks, the court
recognized the unfairness of sovereign immunity:' people who were injured due to
the State's negligence could not seek damages against the State. 47 The legislature
37.
38.
39.
40.

NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15 (1977).
NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976).
Id.; NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977); NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975).
NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977). Section 41-4-15(A) of the Tort Claims Act states:
Actions against a governmental entity or a public employee for torts shall be forever barred,
unless such action is commenced within two years after the date of occurrence resulting in loss,
injury or death, except that a minor under the full age of seven years shall have until his ninth
birthday in which to file. This subsection applies to all persons regardless of minority or other
legal disability.

Id.
41. Section 41-5-13 states:
No claim for malpractice arising out of an act of malpractice which occurred subsequent to the
effective date of the Medical Malpractice Act [41-5-1 NMSA 1978] may be brought against a
health care provider unless filed within three years after the date that the act of malpractice
occurred except that a minor under the full age of six years shall have until his ninth birthday in
which to file. This subsection [section] applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal
disability.
NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976) (alterations in original).
42. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
43. Both statutes were enacted in 1976. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15 (1977); NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976).
44. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1976); see Estate ofGutierrez v. Albuquerque Police Dep't, 104 N.M. 111,
113, 717 P.2d 87, 89 (1986), overruled by Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 107 N.M. 463, 760 P.2d 155 (1988).
45. The court stated, "[W]e take this opportunity to rid the State of this legal anachronism. Common law
sovereign immunity may no longer be interposed as a defense by the State... in tort actions." Hicks, 88 N.M. at 590,
544 P.2d at 1155. Sovereign immunity protected the state government from lawsuits the State did not consent to,
so its abolishment greatly increased potential government liability and taxpayer costs. Id. at 589, 544 P.2d at 1154;
see State ex rel. Evans v. Field, 27 N.M. 384, 387, 201 P. 1059, 1060 (1921), overruledin partby Hicks, 88 N.M.
588, 544 P.2d 1153.
46. Hicks, 88 N.M. at 592, 544 P.2d at 1157.
47. The Tort Claims Act attempts to "ameliorate the harshness of the rule of immunity for certain acts of
governmental entities when the same acts by private parties would yield liability." Rivera v. N.M. Highway &
Transp. Dep't, 115 N.M. 562, 564, 855 P.2d 136, 138 (Ct. App. 1993); NMSA 1978, § 41-4-2 (1976).
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recognized the increased liability and financial difficulty the new policy posed for
the State.4" The state legislators attempted to balance the unfair results of sovereign
immunity and the need to protect the government from unlimited liability by passing
the Tort Claims Act.49
At the same time the legislature was creating the Tort Claims Act, nationally there
was a perceived crisis in the medical field." The crisis was instigated when
Travelers Insurance Companies announced its withdrawal as the State's medical
insurance underwriter."' The company withdrew because of an increase in the
number of malpractice claims, coupled with an increase in verdict amounts. 2 Ninety
percent of the State's doctors and medical facilities had insurance through Travelers
Insurance. 3 The withdrawal of insurance coverage raised issues as to whether
doctors could find malpractice insurance and remain in the state and whether
patients would have a monetary remedy for malpractice actions.5 4
In an effort to protect the public by addressing these concerns, the legislature
enacted the Medical Malpractice Act.5 The legislature wanted to ensure access to
affordable malpractice insurance so doctors could carry liability insurance and
remain in New Mexico. 56 With these objectives in mind, the legislature, in the
Medical Malpractice Act, shortened the statute of limitations affecting children,
enacting a provision similar to that of the Tort Claims Act. 7

48. See supranote 45; infra note 49.
49. Ferguson v. N.M. State Highway Comm'n, 99 N.M. 194, 195, 656 P.2d 244, 245 (1982) ("[The
legislature] substituted statutory partial immunity for common law total immunity and the court's denial of any
immunity."). See section 41-4-2(A), which states:
The legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On the other hand, the legislature recognizes
that while a private party may readily be held liable for his torts within the chosen ambit of his
activity, the area within which the government has the power to act for the public good is almost
without limit, and therefore government should not have the duty to do everything that might
be done.
NMSA 1978, § 414-2(A) (1976); see also Estate of Gutierrez, 104 N.M. at 113,717 P.2d at 89; Methola v. County
of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 331, 622 P.2d 234, 236 (1980).
50. Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717,722-23 (Ohio 1986); Thea Andrews, Comment, Infant Tolling
Statutes in Medical Malpractice Cases: State ConstitutionalChallenges,5 J. LEGAL MED. 469, 470 (1984).
51. Ruth L. Kovnat, MedicalMalpractice Legislationin New Mexico, 7 N.M. L. REV. 5, 7 (1976-1977).
52. Id. at 8-9.
53. Id.at8n.l1.
54. Id. at 7-8.
55. NMSA 1978, § 41-5-1 (1992). "The purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act is to promote the health
and welfare of the people of New Mexico by making available professional liability insurance for health care
providers in New Mexico." NMSA 1978, § 41-5-2 (1976).
56. See Moncor Trust Co. ex rel. Flynn v. Feil, 105 N.M. 444, 446, 733 P.2d 1327, 1329 (1987) ("An
obvious goal of the legislature in enacting this legislation was to address certain factors adversely affecting the cost
of medical malpractice insurance, to encourage continued availability of professional medical services, and to
provide incentives for the furnishing of professional liability insurance."); see also Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 493,
499, 697 P.2d 493, 499 (Ct. App. 1984), rev"d in part, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985) (citing Kovnat, supra
note 51, at 7).
57. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 539, 893 P.2d 428, 435 (1995) ("mak[ing] malpractice insurance
more affordable and thereby encourag[ing] more physicians to carry such insurance"). The legislature also attempted
to decrease Medical Malpractice claims by making the Act a statute of repose rather than a traditional statute of
limitations. NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976). Under the Medical Malpractice Act, the statute of limitations starts
running when the malpractice occurs and not when the injury is discovered. Id.; see, e.g., Kern v. St. Joseph Hosp.
Ind., 102 N.M. 452, 455, 697 P.2d 135, 138 (1985) ("The statute clearly starts to run from the time of the occurrence
of the act giving rise to the cause of action."). With the general statute of limitations, the time limitation begins when
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By implementing shortened statutes of limitations for children, both the Tort
Claims Act and the Medical Malpractice Act limit stale claims and, subsequently,
state and medical malpractice liability.5" Although both statutes allow extra time for
young minors, overall the statutes provide for a shorter period of time for a child to
file a claim against the state or a private doctor covered by the Medical Malpractice
Act than a child would have under the general tort rules.59 The acts' requirements
raise concerns about the constitutionality of the statutes of limitation as applied to
minors. 60 The concern is that the state legislature cannot impose unreasonable
restrictions on a child's constitutional right of access to the courts.6 '
There are two lines of cases addressing the constitutionality of these acts. One
line of cases has assessed the constitutionality of the Tort Claims Act notice
requirement as applied to minors.62 The other has assessed both acts' statutes of
limitations requirements as applied to adults.63 No cases have addressed the Medical
Malpractice Act's notice provision with regard to minors. JaramilloI and Jaramillo

the injury is discovered. NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975); Kovnat, supra note 51, at 32-33. The New Mexico
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari review of a court of appeals ruling holding that the Tort Claims Act also
acts as a statute of repose. Maestas v. Zager, 2005-NMCA-013, 105 P.3d 317, cert. granted(N.M. Dec. 20, 2004)
(No. 28,997). But see Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 191, 730 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct. App. 1986) ("We have
recognized that under the Tort Claims Act the limitation period commences when an injury manifests itself and is
ascertainable, rather than when the wrongful or negligent act occurs.").
58. The statute of limitations is shorter than the general tort limitation, which allows a child to make a claim
until the age of nineteen. Compare NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977), and NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976), with
NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975).
59. NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975).
60. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents ofthe Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 200 I-NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931;
Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204. Other jurisdictions have faced the issue of whether statutory
limits violate children's rights and are split on their outcomes. On one hand, states have ruled that shortened statute
of limitations periods are invalid as applied to minors. See Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp., 692 P.2d 280 (Ariz.
1984) (medical malpractice act); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (equal protection, medical
malpractice act); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986) (medical malpractice act); Schwan v.
Riverside Methodist Hosp., 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 1983) (equal protection, medical malpractice act); Mominee
v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 1986) (due process, medical malpractice act); Lyons v. Lederle Labs., 440
N.W.2d 769 (S.D. 1989) (equal protection, medical malpractice act); Sax v. Votteler, 648 SW.2d 661 (Tex. 1983)
(due process, medical malpractice act); Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995) (medical liability act); Lee
v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993) (equal protection, medical malpractice act); Whitlow v. Bd. of Educ., 438
S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1993) (equal protection, governmental tort claims act). See also infra note 75 for examples of
states holding invalid shortened notice requirements for minors.
On the other hand, many states have upheld shortened statute of limitations periods as applied to minors. See
Barlow v. Humana, Inc., 495 So. 2d 1048 (Ala. 1986) (constitutional challenge to medical malpractice statute);
Licano v. Krausnick, 663 P.2d 1066 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (equal protection challenge to medical malpractice
statute); Smith v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 423 S.E.2d 235 (Ga. 1992) (equal protection challenge
to medical malpractice statute); Crowe v. Humana, 439 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. 1994); Thompson v. Franciscan Sisters
Health Care Corp., 578 N.E.2d 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891 (hid. 1980);
Bonin v. Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754 (Kan. 1996); Me. Med. Ctr. v. Cote, 577 A.2d 1173 (Me. 1990); Plummer v.
Gillieson, 692 N.E.2d 528 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Bissell v. Kommareddi, 509 N.W.2d 542 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993);
Hohn v. Slate, 269 S.E.2d 307 (N.C. 1980); Shaw v. Zabel, 517 P.2d 1187 (Or. 1974); Halverson v. Tydrich, 456
N.W.2d 852 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
61. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 7, 23 P.3d at
9, 100 P.3d at 207. For discussion on access to courts as a
932; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123,
constitutional right, see infra Part II.C.
62. See, e.g., Tafoya v. Doe, 100 N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1983); Rider v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch.,
1996-NMCA-090, 923 P.2d 604; Erwin v. City of Santa Fe, 115 N.M. 596, 855 P.2d 1060 (Ct. App. 1993).
63. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. State, IIl N.M. 722, 809 P.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1991); Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs.,
1996-NMSC-035, 918 P.2d 1321.
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II are the first cases to address this legislatively imposed statute of limitations with
regard to minors.'
C. LitigationInvolving the Tort Claims Act Notice Requirement as Applied to
Minors
The New Mexico courts have examined in depth the Tort Claims Act's ninetyday notice requirement as applied to minors. 65 At the outset of this examination, the
court of appeals established a minor's right of access to the courts 66 and right to seek
redress for a cause of action 67 as property rights, protected by the federal and state
constitutional due process clauses. Although these property rights cannot be taken
without due process, 6 the New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that there can
be time limitations imposed on the rights,69 such as the Tort Claims Act statute of
limitations, as long as the time restrictions are reasonable.70
The primary case challenging the reasonableness requirement of the Tort Claims
Act's ninety-day notice limitation as applied to a minor in tort litigation against the
state government was Tafoya v. Doe.7' Tafoya involved an infant who failed to give
notice to the government of an impending lawsuit within ninety days of the injury.72
In Tafoya, the court determined that ninety days was an unreasonably short amount
of time for a baby to give notice of a pending lawsuit.73 Subsequently, it found the
64. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. ofN.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931;
Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204.
65. See Tafoya, 100 N.M. 328,670 P.2d 582; Rider, 1996-NMCA-090, 923 P.2d 604; Erwin, 115 N.M. 596,
855 P.2d 1060.
66. Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 331,670 P.2d at 585 (quoting Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 180 N.W.2d 778, 781
(Mich. 1970) ("[Glenerally an accrued right of action is a vested property right which may not be arbitrarily
impinged.")).
67. Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425,426, 659 P.2d 311, 312 (1983).
68. Jiron held that a person should have due process before being deprived of access to the courts. Id. at 426,
659 P.2d at 312. Other jurisdictions also have held that access to the courts is a property right that cannot be taken
without due process. Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 331,670 P.2d at 585; see also Grubaugh, 180 N.W.2d at 781 ("Generally
an accrued right of action is a vested property right which may not be arbitrarily impinged."). Grubaugh indicated
that it would be unfair to bar a minor plaintiffwho suffers from an age disability the right to file the cause of action
without due process. Grubaugh, 180 N.W.2d at 781; Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 331, 670 P.2d at 585.
69. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 121, 965 P.2d 305, 311 ("Access to the courts...is
not boundless.").
70. Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 332, 670 P.2d at 585 ("A state may bar a right if a reasonable time is given to
enforce that right."). See Terry v. N.M. State Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 122, 645 P.2d 1375, 1378 (1982)
("The general rule is that statutes of limitation may be passed where formerly there were none, and existing
limitation periods may be reduced while the time is still running, provided that a reasonable time is left for the
institution of an action before it is time-barred." (citing Cutler v. United States, 202 Ct. Cl. 221 (1973); Walker v.
City of Salinas, 128 Cal. Rptr. 832, 837 (1976); Stanley v. Denning, 264 N.E.2d 521,525 (111. App. Ct. 1970))). See
generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation ofActions §§ 27-35 (2000). The constitutionality of statutes of limitation has
hinged on the reasonableness of the time provided to pursue a remedy. Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians
v. Helix Irrigation Dist., 514 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1975); Town of Brookline v. Carey, 245 N.E.2d 446 (Mass. 1969).
71. 100 N.M. at 331-32, 670 P.2d at 585-86.
72. Id. at 329, 670 P.2d at 583. Tafoya v. Doe was filed by Sally Tafoya on behalf of herself and her infant
daughter. The suit was brought after the Tort Claims Act ninety-day notice period had expired. The baby was born
with a blood immunization problem that was allegedly the result of a transfusion that Sally Tafoya had received
several years prior to her pregnancy. The court reviewed the constitutionality of the ninety-day notice requirement
as applied to the infant who inherently lacked the ability to the file the claim within the requisite time period. Id.
73. Id. at 332, 670 P.2d at 586. The court applied the holding while acknowledging the absence of a
provision requiring parents to file on the baby's behalf. Id. Rider v. Albuquerque Public Schools also found the
ninety-day notice requirement unconstitutional because the injured six-year-old plaintiffwas unable to comply with
the notice limitation. 1996-NMCA-090, 1 8, 923 P.2d 604, 606.
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requirement to be an unconstitutional violation of the young plaintiff s due process
rights.74 The court also noted that a time period reasonable for an adult is not
necessarily reasonable for a minor.75
In Erwin v. City of Santa Fe,76 the court had to determine if the Tafoya holding,
regarding the Tort Claims Act notice requirement as it pertained to an infant, applied
equally to a fourteen-year-old plaintiff. The court narrowly interpreted the Tafoya
holding to conclude that the statute was facially constitutional." The court then
determined whether the statute was constitutionally applied by assessing the
reasonableness requirement and the minor's ability to comply with it.78 Given the
flexibility of the reasonableness requirement of the Due Process Clause79 and the
minor's circumstances,"0 the court found that the minor might have been able to
comply with the notice requirement. 8 If the fourteen-year-old minor was able to
comply with the time limitation,82 then he was not denied access to the courts due
to the statutory limitations, and the statute was not a violation of his rights.83
The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the same -issue in Rider v.
Albuquerque Public Schools,"a which involved a six-year-old plaintiff who was
injured on a school playground. This time, the court found the Tort Claims Act's
ninety-day notice requirement unconstitutionally applied because the minor was
unable to comply with the statute of limitations.8 6 Through Tafoya,87 Rider,88 and
Erwin,89 the court established an ad hoc, case-by-case review for cases involving

74. Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 332, 670 P.2d at 586.
75. Id. at 331-32, 670 P.2d at 585-86 (reasoning that young minors are inherently unable to comply with
the notice requirement) (citing McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 120 N.E. 476, 478 (11. 1918)). Other
jurisdictions have found unconstitutional shortened notice requirements for minors when suing the government. See,
e.g., McCrary v. City of Odessa, 482 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1972); Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879 (Nev. 1973); City
of Barnesville v. Powell, 183 S.E.2d 55 (Ga. 1971); Lazich v. Belanger, 105 P.2d 738 (Mont. 1940).
76. 115 N.M. 596, 855 P.2d 1060 (Ct. App. 1993). The plaintiff in Erwin was a fourteen year old who had
been "hit by a car while riding his bicycle." Id. at 597, 855 P.2d at 1061. The minor and his father filed suit against
the City of Santa Fe under the Tort Claims Act, claiming that the City was negligent in its maintenance and
inspection of the street. Id.
77. Id. ("A statute which is facially constitutional may, then, be unconstitutional as applied.").
78. Id. at 599, 855 P.2d at 1063.
79. Id. ("Due process.. is a malleable principle which must be molded to each situation, considering both
the rights of the government and the rights of the individual.").
80. Id. The court considered whether the minor had retained counsel and whether the retaining of counsel
had occurred within the limitations period. Id.
81. Id.
82. The case was remanded for a more in-depth determination of the minor's ability to comply with the
notice requirement. Id.
83. Id.
84. 1996-NMCA-090, 923 P.2d 604.
85. Id. 1 2, 923 P.2d at 605.
86. Id. It 8, 15, 923 P.2d at 606, 608 (referring to minors as having a "special disability" that makes them
"incapable of satisfying notice provisions"). Rider adopted the holding in order to further. New Mexico's "long
tradition of interpreting laws carefully to safeguard minors." Id. 13, 923 P.2d at 607. As stated in Rider,
If we were to assume our legislature intended the ninety day notice to apply to infants incapable
of protecting themselves, this would be the same as the legislature choosing to exclude children
altogether from the Act, except for ihose few fortunate enough to have notice filed for them by
adult representatives.
Id. 8, 923 P.2d at 606.
87. 100N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582.
88. 1996-NMCA-090, 923 P.2d 604.
89. 115 N.M. 596, 855 P.2d 1060.
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minors and the notice requirement. The court created criteria, such as age and
retention of counsel, for determining the minor's ability to comply with the notice
requirement. However, the court failed to provide guidance as to how the criteria are
to be applied in future cases.9"
D. LitigationInvolving the Tort Claims Act and the Medical MalpracticeAct
Statute of Limitations as Applied to Adults
The New Mexico courts have also examined both the Tort Claims Act and
Medical Malpractice Act statute of limitations as applied to adults.9' In Jaramillov.
State," a guardian sued on behalf of an incompetent adult, claiming that the twoyear statute of limitations in the Tort Claims Act was an unreasonably short period
of time in which to file a tort claim against the government.9 3 The court refused to
accept this argument.94 The court instead recognized that the limitation protected
legitimate state interests, including protection from stale claims. 95 In addition, the
court refused to equate the disability of being a minor with the disability of being
incapacitated due to an accident.96 The court acknowledged that some time
restrictions, such as the ninety-day notice period, can be unreasonably short in
certain cases.97 However, the Tort Claims Act's two-year limitation period is much
longer than ninety days, so the court did not find the statute unconstitutionally
applied due to an unfairly short time period.9" Thus, Jaramillo was unable to sue
because he missed the two-year deadline. 99
Five years later, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Cummings v. X-Ray
Associates,'°° examined the application of the Medical Malpractice Act statute of
limitations as applied to adults.' ' Cummings claimed that it was an unfair violation
of her due process rights because the statute acted as a statute of repose,' 2 rather
than as a traditional statute of limitations. °3 The court found the statute
constitutional for several reasons: (1) only a small percentage of cases are affected
05
by the limitation;""° (2) Cummings could have taken action sooner to file her case;1
and (3) although the statute acted as a statute of repose, it was enacted to protect

90. Id. at 600, 855 P.2d at 1064 (Apodaca, J., specially concurring).
91. See Jaramillo v. State, 111 N.M. 722, 809 P.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1991); Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs., 1996NMSC-035, 918 P.2d 1321.
92. 111 N.M. 722, 809 P.2d 636.
93. Id. at 726, 809 P.2d at 640.
94. Id. at 727, 809 P.2d at 641.
95. Id. at 725-26, 809 P.2d at 639-40.
96. Id. at 727, 809 P.2d at 641.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 1996-NMSC-035, 918 P.2d 1321.
101. See id.
102. See supra note 57.
103. See Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, 117, 918 P.2d at 1327-28.
104. Id. 39, 918 P.2d at 1333 (citing Scott A. DeVries, Medical MalpracticeActs'Statutes of Limitation
as They Apply to Minors: Are They Proper?, 28 IND. L. REV. 413, 415 (1995) (describing a survey revealing that
in only "ten percent of the claims the time lapse was three years")).
105. Id. 56,918P.2dat 1336.
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legitimate state interests."°6 Therefore, there was no violation of Cummings' due
process rights.
In summary, the New Mexico courts upheld both Acts' statutes of limitations as
constitutionally applied to adults. However, the court found that the Tort Claims Act
notice requirement was unconstitutionally applied to minors in certain
circumstances. 0 7 JaramilloI and JaramilloII combined the two lines of cases to
address the constitutionality of both acts' statutes of limitations as applied to
minors. I"' The court of appeals weighed the State's concern for the protection of
children against the valid State interests sought to be protected by the Tort Claims
Act and the Medical Malpractice Act. 9
111.STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JaramilloI and JaramilloII were filed by Lisa Jaramillo on behalf of her minor
son, Anthony Jaramillo." 0 Anthony was born in 1990". and during the following
year developed a seizure condition that required treatment."' As part of his
treatment plan, Anthony took phenobarbital, an anti-seizure medication." 3 Shortly
after starting the medication, he developed a blood platelet disorder." 4 On April 27,
1992, Anthony sought help from his private pediatrician, Dr. Heaton, who advised
Anthony to stop taking phenobarbital" 5 and referred Anthony to the University of
New Mexico Hospital (UNMH)." 6 Neither Dr. Heaton nor the doctors at UNMH
prescribed another anti-seizure medication." 7 In March of 1993, several months
after Anthony's hospital visit, Anthony had a grand mal seizure, which resulted in
severe brain damage and physical and mental disability."'
On April 23, 1999, six years after the seizure and almost three months after
Anthony's ninth birthday, Lisa Jaramillo, Anthony's mother, filed suit on Anthony's
behalf. Her first suit was filed against UNMH under the Tort Claims Act," 9

106. See id. -H 38-39, 918 P.2d at 1332-33 (stating that medical malpractice insurance providers were
withdrawing coverage because of the potential of being sued many years after the act of malpractice).
107. See supra Part I.C.
108. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health& Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931;
Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d. 204.
109. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. ofN.M. Health& Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931;
Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204; infra Part IV.
110. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health& Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931;
Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204.
111. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 2, 100 P.3d at 206.
112. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 2, 23 P.3d at
931.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 2, 100 P.3d at 206.
116. Id. UNMH is a public entity and, therefore, is covered under the Tort Claims Act. NMSA 1978, § 41-43(B)-(C) (2003).
117. See Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 1 3, 100 P.3d at 206; Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 2, 23 P.3d at 931.
118. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 2,23 P.3d at
931.
119. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977).
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asserting that the hospital was negligent in its care of Anthony (Jaramillo1). 120On
August 27, 1999, Lisa Jaramillo filed a different negligence suit against Dr. Heaton,
a private doctor covered under the Medical Malpractice Act 21 (Jaramillofl).22 Lisa
claimed that Anthony's grand mal seizure and subsequent brain damage were a
result of Dr. Heaton taking Anthony off phenobarbital and the failure
of either Dr.
23
Heaton or UNMH to prescribe another anti-seizure medication.
In JaramilloI, UNMH filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was barred
by the Tort Claims Act statute of limitations requirement, 124 which had expired on
Anthony's ninth birthday, February 2, 1999.125 In JaramilloII, Heaton filed a similar
motion to dismiss, claiming that the case was barred by the Medical Malpractice
Act's statute of limitations requirement, which also had expired on Anthony's ninth
birthday.126 The trial court dismissed both cases and Jaramillo appealed, claiming27
each statute was unconstitutionally applied to Anthony because he was a minor.
The court of appeals found that the statutes of limitations in the Tort Claims Act and
the Medical Malpractice Act violated Anthony's due process right to seek redress
from the courts.' 28
IV.RATIONALE AND ANAYLSIS
The question presented in JaramilloI and JaramilloII was whether the State's
interest in protecting children and children's right of access to the courts outweighed
other legitimate state interests. 29 Children have a substantive due process right to
pursue a cause of action. However, "[d]ue process... is a malleable principle which
must be molded to each situation, considering both the rights of the government and
the rights of the individual."' 3 ° Although protecting the State from stale claims and
providing low insurance premiums for doctors are valid concerns, the court of
appeals favored the protection of the minor Anthony Jaramillo's constitutional due
120. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 200 1-NMCA-024, 2, 23 P.3d
at 931.
121. NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976).
122. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 1 3, 100 P.3d at 206.
123. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 2, 23 P.3d at
931; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, t 2-3, 100 P.3d at 206.
124. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 2, 23 P.3d at
931; see Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977).
125. NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977).
126. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 1 3, 100 P.3d at 206; NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976).
127. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 1, 23 P.3d
at 931; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 1, 100 P.3d at 206.
128. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 1 1, 23 P.3d at
931; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123,
1, 100 P.3d at 206. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted
certiorari review ofJaramillov. Boardof Regents of the University ofNew Mexico Health & Sciences Center.When
Jaramillov. Heaton reached the court of the appeals, the court certified the case (which it had not yet decided) to
be considered in conjunction with Jaramillov. BoardofRegents of the University of New Mexico Health& Sciences
Center. When the supreme court later quashed certiorari review in Jaramillov. Board of Regents of the University
of New Mexico Health & Sciences Center, thus rendering the court of appeals holding final, it also remanded
Jaramillov. Heaton. At that point, in August 2004, the court of appeals reviewed the merits ofJaramillov. Heaton.
2004-NMCA-123, U 4-5, 100 P.3d at 206; see Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr.,
2001-NMCA-024, -N 1-2, 23 P.3d at 931.
129. For a discussion on weighing these interests, see Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 726 (Ohio
1986) (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring).
130. Erwin v. City of Santa Fe, 115 N.M. 596, 599, 855 P.2d 1060, 1063 (Ct. App. 1993).
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process right to seek redress in the courts.' 3' The court, though, did offer some
protection of competing state interests by not finding the Tort Claims Act and
Medical Malpractice Act per se unconstitutional as applied to minors.'32
Consequently, the holdings require a "fact-based interpretation"' 33 of new cases
involving the statutes and minors to determine if a child is able to comply with the
requirements.' 34 As is common with ad hoc examinations, the court failed to delimit
specific criteria, beyond age and retention of counsel, for this decision.'3 5 In
JaramilloI and Jaramillo II, the court essentially applied the reasoning from the
notice requirement, as applied to minors,'36 to
cases involving the Tort Claims Act
37
the statute of limitations context.
During the court's constitutional analysis of the Tort Claims Act in JaramilloI
and the Medical Malpractice Act inJaramilloII, the court considered Anthony's age
and inherent mental capacity to be the most important factors. 3 ' Because Anthony
was a young child with mental immaturity, he was unable to comply with the
requirements.' 39 Because he was unable to comply with the statute of limitations,
Anthony was barred access to the courts. Denial of court access was a violation of
his due process rights. 4 Consequently, the court found the statutes unreasonable
131. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. ofN.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 200 l-NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931;
Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204. The Due Process Clause guarantees the right to protect one's
property interests through legal channels, while "focus[ing] on the validity of legislation as it equally burdens all
persons in the exercise of a specific right." Marrujo v. N.M. State Highway Transp. Dep't, 118 N.M. 753, 757, 887
P.2d 747, 751 (1994) (citing JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITuTIONAL LAw 423 (2d ed. 1983)).
132. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, i 9-10, 23 P.3d
at 932-33; see Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 19, 100 P.3d at 209.
133. Erwin, 115 N.M. at 600, 855 P.2d at 1064 (Apodaca, J., specially concurring).
134. See infra Part V.C.
135. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, in 9-10,
17-19, 100 P.3d at 209; see also Erwin, 115 N.M.
23 P.3d at 932-33; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123,
at 600, 855 P.2d at 1064 (Apodaca, J., specially concurring). Although Judge Apodaca specially concurred in the
denial of summary judgment, he believed the holding was confusing. He stated that the majority had "adopted an
unworkable, fact-based interpretation of Tafoya that will lead eventually to confusion for the trial courts and bar,
as well as unnecessary appeals." Id.
136. Tafoya v. Doe, 100 N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1983); Erwin, 115 N.M. 596, 855 P.2d 1060;
Rider v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 1996-NMCA-090, 923 P.2d 604.
137. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 6, 23 P.3d at
932; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 1 1, 100 P.3d at 208.
138. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 10,23 P.3d
18-19, 100 P.3d at 209.
at 933; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123,
139. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 10,23 P.3d
at 933; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 1 18-19, 100 P.3d at 209.
140. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. ofN.M. Health& Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, I 9-10,23 P.3d
at 932-33; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, TI18-19, 100 P.3d at 209. Anthony also claimed that the Tort
Claims Act statute of limitations, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-15(A) (1977), was an unconstitutional violation of his equal
protection right expressed in article H, section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. The court in these cases
dismissed the equal protection issue without any discussion or justification. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 10, 23 P.3d at 933; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 19,
100 P.3d at 209.
Equal protection affords the same treatment for individuals in similar circumstances. The U.S. Supreme Court
mandated in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971), that
[t]he Equal Protection Clause of [the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution]
does.. deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed
by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that
statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'
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and unconstitutionally applied, but the court did not find them per se unconstitutional. 4 '
A. Jaramillo I-Tort Claims Act Statute ofLimitations
In JaramilloI, the court of appeals began its analysis by equating the Tort Claims
Act notice requirement to the statute of limitations requirements for purposes of the
due process analysis. 142 The court noted that although, practically speaking, the
notice and statute of limitations requirements are different, "the notice provision
operate[s] as a statute of limitation.' ' 143 As a result, the court was able to apply the
rationale from the notice cases to JaramilloL 144
All of the notice cases discussed age 45 and held that a child's age inhibits the
child from complying with the statute of limitations in the same manner as an
147
adult.146 The court in JaramilloI reiterated that minors face a "special disability'
due to their age, 41 thus making age a primary consideration for the court. After
acknowledging this inherent difference between children and adults, the court in
Jaramillo I adopted the general rule that "a child who is incapable of meeting a
statutory deadline cannot have that deadline applied to bar the child's right to legal
relief." 49 The court in Jaramillo I was not focused "on the absolute or relative

Id. (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
Under the Tort Claims Act and the New Mexico general tort statute, NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975), children
are afforded different statute of limitations periods. The distinction depends on whether the child is suing the
government or a private tortfeasor. In court briefs, Jaramillo argued that the distinction was a violation of equal
protection. The court of appeals in Jaramillov. State addressed and dismissed the equal protection issue because
the classification in the Tort Claims Act relied on "the character of the defendant, not the mental incapacity of the
plaintiff." 111 N.M. 722, 725, 809 P.2d 636, 639 (1991) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432 (1985)). The court refused to address the issue iniaramillov. BoardofRegents of the University of New Mexico
Health & Sciences Center, stating that the equal protection issue "confuse[d] what [was] otherwise a simple and
straightforward issue." 2001-NMCA-024, 1 10, 23 P.3d at 933.
141. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 10, 23 P.3d
at 933; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 19, 100 P.3d at 209.
142. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 1, 23 P.3d at
931; see, e.g., Hagen v. Faherty, 2003-NMCA-060, 14, 66 P.3d 974,978 (citing Espanola Hous. Auth. v. Atencio,
90 N.M. 787, 789, 568 P.2d 1233, 1235 (1977) (comparing notice provisions with statute of limitations)).
143. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 6,23 P.3d at
932 (citing Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 331, 670 P.2d at 585).
144. Id. 4, 23 P.3d at 932.
145. Precedent cases have found that an infant, Tafoya, 100 N.M. 328,670 P.2d 582, and a six year old, Rider,
1996-NMCA-090, 923 P.2d 604, could not comply with the time limitations, while a fourteen-year-old plaintiff,
Erwin, 115 N.M. at 600, 855 P.2d at 1064, had the potential to comply with the statutory requirements.
146. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 8, 23 P.3d at
932.
147. Id.
148. Anthony's minor status distinguished the case from Jaramillov. State, Ill N.M. 722, 809 P.2d 636 (Ct.
App. 1991), which involved an adult plaintiff who lacked capacity to file his own claim. Because the cases were
not analogous, the holding in Jaramillov. State, which upheld the statute of limitations against a due process claim,
did not have precedential weight for Jaramillo v. Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico Health &
Sciences Center. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 8, 23
P.3d at 932.
149. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 10, 23 P.3d
at 933; see also Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 332, 670 P.2d at 586 ("[O]ne unable to comply with a notice requirement by
reason of minority is protected by the reasonableness requirements of the common law, the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, or similar provisions in their state constitutions.").
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length of time of the [statute of limitations] requirement,"' 15 but rather on the
reasonableness of requiring a child to comply with the statutory limit.' 5 ' The court
concluded that it was unreasonable to require Anthony Jaramillo, a young child with
inherent mental immaturity, to meet the statute of limitations requirement.'52
The court also briefly addressed an alternative to requiring a minor to file a claim,
placing the burden on the parents or guardians to file a tort claim on their child's
behalf.'53 JaramilloI refused to impose this burden on parents and held that a child
should be able to meet statutory time requirements "on his own and without anyone
specifically appointed, either in fact or in law, to help."' 54 In making this determination, the court followed the precedent set forth in Tafoya 55 and Rider.'56 Tafoya
refused to even "consider whether the burden of giving notice [should have been]
placed on another."' 57 Rider expanded on that holding and explained the policy
concerns of imputing a child's due process rights on another.5 8 The New Mexico
courts have yielded to the state legislature any further decision-making power
regarding a parental duty.159
Jaramillo I enabled the young minor to protect his own due process right of
access to the courts by finding the application of the statute of limitations in that
case to be unconstitutional."6° However, the court held that, under different circumstances, a defendant may illustrate "factual issues that could cause the limitation
period to be constitutional."'' The court found situations similar to those discussed
in Erwin'6 2 to be illustrative of a child's ability to comply with the requirement."'
If the child had been capable "of understanding or appreciating his injuries and the
need to file suit" or if "someone on the child's behalf should have filed suit," the

150. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 17, 23 P.3d at
932.
151. Id.
152. Id.(H 10-11, 23 P.3d at 933.
153. Id.915, 23 P.3d at 932.
154. Id.714, 10, 23 P.3d at 932-33.
155. 100 N.M. at 332, 670 P.2d at 586.
156. 1996-NMCA-090, 9 5, 10-14, 923 P.2d at 605-08.
157. Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 332, 670 P.2d at 586. The court in Tafoya also stated that "[i]t is noteworthy that
minority alone is a disability which tolls the general statute of limitations....There is no reason why the minor
should not be similarly protected when the alleged wrongdoer is a governmental entity." Id.at 331, 670 P.2d at 585
(quoting Hunter v. N. Mason High Sch., 529 P.2d 898 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)). The counterargument is that the Tort
Claims Act was a reaction to the rejection of state sovereign immunity and that the government should be afforded
special considerations. See supra Part ll.B.
158. 1996-NMCA-090, 911, 14,923 P.2d at 607-08. See infra text accompanying notes 215-227 for further
explanation of these policy concerns.
159. The legislature is able to examine evidence concerning the number of claims against the government
versus private entities, and it can make policy decisions based on this type of evidence. See Jaramillo v. State, 111
N.M. 722, 726, 809 P.2d 636, 640 (Ct. App. 1991). As of the 2005 legislative session, the New Mexico state
legislature had not enacted legislation requiring parents or guardians to file suits on their child's behalf. For further
discussion on the benefits and disadvantages of imposing this burden on parents, see infra Part IV.D.
160. See Jaramillo v. Bd.of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, IN 10-11,
23 P.3d 931, 933.
161. Id. 919,23 P.3d at 932.
162. 115 N.M. 596, 599, 855 P.2d 1060, 1063 (Ct. App. 1993).
163. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024,1 9,23 P.3d at
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statute of limitations may have been constitutional." 6 UNMH did not prove either
fact, so the statutory requirement was found unreasonable and unconstitutionally
applied to the minor.'65
B. Jaramillo 11-Medical MalpracticeAct Statute ofLimitations
Given the ruling in JaramilloI, the court of appeals in JaramilloII similarly held
that the Medical Malpractice Act statute of limitations was applied unreasonably
because of the minor's young age and was, consequently, a violation of his due
process right to pursue a cause of action.' 66 The court followed the Jaramillo I
rationale but expanded briefly on the policy concerns involved with analyzing the
reasonableness of the statute.' 67
The court began its analysis by assessing the reasonableness of the statute "given
the circumstances of the [minor]."'6 8 Jaramillo H reiterated the "unique
considerations," specifically age and mental capability, involved when a child is the
plaintiff in a case. 6 9 Thus, in Jaramillo II, as in JaramilloI, the court determined
that the statute was unreasonable because of Anthony's status as a minor. 7
Next, the court examined the opposing policy concerns at issue. 7' Heaton, the
defendant, argued that the statute needed to be upheld because it was enacted to
protect legitimate state interests: "to curb the cost of insurance, to encourage
physicians to carry insurance, and to provide a benefit to physicians who opt in to
the Act's provisions by purchasing occurrence-based insurance."' 72 The court did
not dispute the importance of the state interests,'73 but argued that allowing children
to file after the stated limitations period would not significantly hinder the State's

164. Id. The court suggested that someone "should file" for a child, but there exists no legal requirement for
this action. The court failed to illustrate a situation where someone might be required to file on the child's behalf.
Id.
165. Id.
166. See Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204. Although the question called for a de novo
review of the Medical Malpractice Act requirements, the court analogized the issue involved with the Medical
Malpractice Act to the issue in Jaramillov. Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico Health & Sciences
Centerconcerning the Tort Claims Act. See id. 9, 23 P.3d at 207; Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M.
Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931; supra Part W.A.
167. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 13, 100 P.3d at 208.
168. Id. 1 8, 100 P.3d at 207 (quoting Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 541, 893 P.2d 428, 437 (1995)
("[C]onsiderations of fairness implicit in the Due Process Clauses of the United States and New Mexico
Constitutions dictate that when the legislature enacts a limitations period it must allow a reasonable time within
which existing or accruing causes of action may be brought.")).
169. Id. I 11, 100 P.3d at 207 ("[T]here is no amount of time that is per se reasonable or unreasonable in all
situations."). The court distinguished the case from others involving adults. Id. I 11, 100 P.3d at 208; see, e.g.,
Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs., 1996-NMSC-035, 39, 918 P.2d 1321, 1333.
19, 100 P.3d at 209.
170. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123,
171. Id. 9a 12-13, 100 P.3d at 208.
172. Id. 12, 100 P.3d at 208.
173. The only benefit from the shortened limitation period in the Medical Malpractice Act "is the general
reduction of malpractice premiums and lower direct costs of medical care." Kovnat, supra note 51, at 29. However,
even that benefit is in question. See Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 721, 723 (Ohio 1986) (stating that
there is no proof that a statutory bar on minors has reduced insurance premiums). Given that that benefit to the State
is in doubt, it is difficult to prioritize it over children's due process rights. See id., 503 N.E.2d at 726 (Celebrezze,
C.J., concurring) ("I do not believe that access to health care need come at the cost of a minor's access to redress
in the courts.").
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objectives. 74 The court noted that children have a "finite amount of time" to bring
a claim.'7 5 At best, children have until their nineteenth birthdays to file suit.'76 Thus,
allowing minors extra time was fair and did not unduly burden those relying on the
Medical Malpractice Act.' 77 In fact, the court decided that not allowing Anthony's
claim would unfairly and unreasonably78burden the minor, who was inherently
unable to comply with the requirements.1
Similar to JaramilloIand in accordance with precedent, the court refused to hold
parents accountable for filing on their child's behalf' 79 The court refuted Heaton's
statutory argument that section 45-5-209,"8o Rule 1-017,' and section 24-7A6. 1(A) 8 2 impose such a duty on parents. 8 3 Respectively, the statutes impose a duty
on guardians to protect the property of their ward, permit parents to file on their
child's behalf, and allow parents or guardians to make health care decisions for a
no implied parental duty to pursue claims on a child's
minor.184 The court found
85
behalf in these statutes.1
Instead, the court turned to Anthony Jaramillo's own ability to file the claim and
found that he was too young to comply with the time limitation.'86 Thus, the statute
of limitations was unreasonable in the situation. However, the court also stated that
there are circumstances in which holding children accountable to the statute of
limitations would be fair, 18 7 thus illustrating that there are times when88competing
policy objectives support upholding the constitutionality of the statute.1
C. Jaramillo I and Jaramillo H-Possibilitiesfor Future Confusion
JaramilloI and JaramilloII refused to overturn the holding in Erwin that "some
minors may be sufficiently mature to appreciate legal responsibilities and thus

174. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 13, 100 P.3d at 208.
175. Id.; see NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975).
176. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-10 (1975) (providing that minors may file a suit until one year following their
eighteenth birthday).
177. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 13, 100 P.3d at 208.
178. See id.
179. Id. 18, 100 P.3d at 209.
180. NMSA 1978, § 45-5-209 (1995). The statute imposes "a duty on a guardian to protect the property of
aminor ward" but not on parents. Jaramillov. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 15, 100 P.3d at 208 (citingNMSA 1978,
§ 45-5-209 (1995)).
181. Rule 1-017(c)NMRA.
C. Infants or Incompetent Persons
When an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, or
other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent
person.
Id. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 16, 100 P.3d at 208 ("This rule permits a parent to bring a cause of
action on behalf of a minor child, but does not require it.").
182. NMSA 1978, § 24-7A-6.1(A) (1997) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, a parent or guardian of an
unemancipated minor may make that minor's health-care decisions."); Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 16,
100 P.3d at 208. The statute says that parents "may" sue on their child's behalf-assuming a medical malpractice
suit is a health care decision-but the statute does not require the action. NMSA 1978, § 24-7A-6.1(A) (1997).
183. Id.It 15-16, 100 P.3d at 208.
184. See supranotes 180-182 and accompanying text.
185. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, T 17-18, 100 P.3d at 209.
186. Id. 19, 100 P.3d at 209.
187. Id. 18, 100 P.3d at 209.
188. Id.
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become obligated to comply with the ninety day notice provision."' 89 The court left
open the possibility that defendants could show "factual issues" proving that a child
could have met the requirements and should not have the benefit of a ruling in the
child's favor.' 9 If a child is able to comply with the statutory period, the statute
would not be found unconstitutional. 1 ' However, the court never explained the
92
application of the specific requirements for proving a child's ability to comply.
Subsequently, future parties involved with this type of litigation do not have
concrete guidelines for challenging or upholding the constitutionality of the Tort
Claims Act and Medical Malpractice Act. For example, what if the plaintiff was a
mature sixteen-year-old who appeared before a judge to get permission for an
abortion without parental consent? Would this demonstrate that the minor should
have known to file a civil suit within the two-year statute of limitations? Under
Erwin, the court might rule that the minor was old enough to comprehend the legal
system, as evidenced by the minor's prior experience."'
Or, suppose the plaintiff was twelve years old and had no legal understanding but
had parents who contacted an attorney. The court did not explain whether the
analysis turns solely on age or age combined with other circumstances. 94 If age is
the primary criterion, at what age is the child mature enough to comply with the
requirement? The decisions in Tafoya, Erwin, Rider, and now Jaramillo I and
Jaramillo II make it less than clear whether age, age coupled with other indicia, or
prove that a minor is mature enough
another factor altogether would be sufficient to95
to not need an extended statute of limitations. 1
Furthermore, the court in JaramillolandJaramilloII refused to impose a burden
on parents or others to file on a child's behalf;196 but, without elaboration, the court
stated that "specific defendants may be able to prove that such a duty exists in a
particular case."' 97 Again, the court provided no criteria and was vague as to how a
defendant would prove this. Fortunately for children, the court did protect their due
process rights by not decisively transferring children's rights to their parents.
D. Reasons For andAgainst Creatinga Legal Obligationfor Parentsto Pursue a
Tort Action on Their Child'sBehalf
There are essentially two ways to create a legal burden on parents to pursue

189. Rider v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 1996-NMCA-090,1 7, 923 P.2d 604, 606 (explaining the holding in
Erwin) (citing Erwin v. City of Santa Fe, 115 N.M. 596, 598-99, 855 P.2d 1060, 1062-63 (Ct. App. 1993)).
190. Jaramillov. Bd. of Regents ofthe Univ. of N.M. Health& Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 9, 23 P.3d 931,
932.
191. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text; infra notes 193-195 and accompanying text; Jaramillo
v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 18, 100 P.3d at 209.
193. See Erwin, 115 N.M. at 599, 855 P.2d at 1063.
194. It appears that if the child is very young and if no one should have filed for the child, fairness concerns
will weigh in favor of protecting the child. See Tafoya v. Doe, 100 N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1983).
195. Jaramifo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 200 1-NMCA-024, 9, 23 P.3d at
932; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 18, 100 P.3d at 209.
196. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 200 1-NMCA-024, 7, 23 P.3d at
17-18, 100 P.3d at 209.
932; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123,
197. Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 18, 100 P.3d at 209.
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claims on their child's behalf.198 One way is for the courts to interpret statutory

language that parents "may sue"' 99 on behalf of their child as being an obligation
sufficient enough to protect their child's due process right of access to the courts. 200
With this interpretation, parents may or may not sue, but the child has to deal with
the consequences either way.2' 1 The court in JaramilloI and JaramilloII focused

on the inability of a minor,20 2 not parents, to comply with the statutory limitations,2 3
and thus refused to interpret the statute as implying that a child's due process rights
are protected through the child's parents' action or inaction. 2" This sentiment is in
accordance with New Mexico's "long tradition of interpreting laws carefully to
safeguard minors."20 5
The other way to impose a legal burden on parents is for the legislature to create
a statutory duty requiring parents to file on their child's behalf.2 6 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals has stated that the legislature is free to create such a duty after
weighing the policy concerns.20 7 There are reasons for supporting and for opposing
the parental burden.
1. Reasons to Impose a Burden on Parents
It can be argued that filing a tort claim for your own child is simply another
parental duty in the long list of responsibilities that parents have for their children.
Common sense acknowledges that parents are responsible for everything their child

198. This Note does not consider whether the decision is for the judiciary or the legislature, but simply
whether parents should shoulder their child's responsibility of filing a tort lawsuit against the State or doctors
covered under the Medical Malpractice Act.
199. Rule 1-017(c) NMRA. See supranotes 180-185 and accompanying text.
200. Rider v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 1996-NMCA-090, In 11-12, 923 P.2d 604, 607. Other jurisdictions
are split on their interpretations of similar statutory language and the issue of whether a minor should have to rely
on someone else to sue on the minor's behalf See, e.g., Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 532 P.2d 346, 350
(Colo. 1975) ("[lit is clear that the next friend's action or inaction in commencing the suit cannot prejudice the
minor's rights."); Doe v. Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Idaho 1986) (holding that a minor should not have to rely
upon the actions of others for the protection of that minor's rights). But see, e.g., Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465
A.2d 1120, 1125 (Me. 1983) (determining that a minor's rights were sufficiently protected by a statutory provision
that a parent, or other agent, may file notice of claim on the child's behalf); George v. Town of Saugus, 474 N.E.2d
169, 171 (Mass. 1985) (holding that notice requirements should not be tolled for minors because their interests can
be protected by their guardians).
201. See infra Part IV.D.2.
202. Tafoya relied in part on a case involving a thirteen-year-old plaintiff that held that a 120-day notice
requirement "would create 'an incompatability with due process and equal protection requirements."' Tafoya, 100
N.M. 328, 331, 670 P.2d 582, 585 (quoting Cook v. State, 521 P.2d 725, 728 (Wash. 1974)).
203. Tafoya, 100 N.M. 328,670 P.2d 582; Rider, 1996-NMCA-090, 923 P.2d 604; Erwin, 115 N.M. 596, 855
P.2d 1060; Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001-NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931;
Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204. There appears some contradiction in the holding inJaramillo
v. Heaton that provides an opportunity for the defense to prove that someone should have filed on the child's behalf.
The court stated, "[W]e will not imply a broad parental or custodial duty to file a medical malpractice suit on behalf
of a child, [but] specific defendants may be able to prove that such a duty exists in a particular case." 2004-NMCA123, 18, 100 P.3d at 209. The court did not explain how the defense would prove that someone should have filed
on behalf of the child when there is no statutory or common law requirement for a parent to do so. Id.
204. Rider, 1996-NMCA-090, 11, 923 P.2d at 607.
205. Id. 1 13, 923 P.2d at 607.
206. See, e.g., id. 5, 15, 923 P.2d at 605, 608.
207. See id. 5, 923 P.2d at 605.
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needs,2" 8 from clothing to food to health care.20 9 Statutes and case law have
acknowledged parental responsibilities and created legal parental duties.2 10
According to these laws, parents must provide adequate medical care,2 1' ensure that
children attend school,2 12 and financially support their children.2 13 Moreover, parents
should have an interest in protecting their child's legal well-being. Therefore, it is
not unreasonable "to expect that others will protect a minor's rights. 214 While it is
now up to the legislature to change the law, the court in JaramilloI and Jaramillo
H did not find these reasons persuasive enough to hold that a parent has a duty to file
on their child's behalf
2. Reasons to Not Impose a Burden on Parents
The primary reason to not impose a burden on parents is to protect the child's
individual legal rights. Making a child suffer because an adult parent or guardian
failed to file a claim on the child's behalf is not fair and is a violation of that child's
due process rights. Children have their own rights, as recognized in statutes and case
law.21 5 Children should be afforded due process in protecting their own property
interests. Parental negligence for failing to bring a claim should not be imputed to
children.216 Children should not have to rely on someone else's "foresight to file a
timely claim" or suffer negative consequences because another person "through
inadvertence or ignorance" did not act. 217 Also, not all children have parents; some
children are living in institutions, in foster care, with grandparents or other family
members, or on their own.215 Additionally, not all parents act responsibly in the care
of their children.21 9 Imposing a duty on parents or guardians would put "children
unnecessarily... at risk" and would "impute to the child the consequences of parental
default., 220 Moreover, some jurisdictions have found that "it would violate due
condition
the legal rights of the child upon the gratuitous performance of
process to 22
1
the adult.",

208. As a minor ages, the minor may be able to increase self-sufficiency.
209. See infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 207 and accompanying text; infra notes 212-214 and accompanying text. For example,
section 66-7-369(B) provides that parents must have their children in child restraint devices while in a moving car
until they are twelve years old. NMSA 1978, § 66-7-369(B) (2005).
211. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-2(E)(1999).
212. Compulsory School Attendance Law, NMSA 1978, § 22-12-2(C) (2004).
213. Quintana v. Quintana, 83 N.M. 772, 774, 497 P.2d 1404, 1406 (1972). Guardians also are responsible
for their child's "support, care and education." NMSA 1978, § 45-5-209(A) (1995).
214. Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 19 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
215. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
216. Rider v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 1996-NMCA-090, 11,923 P.2d 604, 607; Tafoya v. Doe, 100 N.M.
328, 332, 670 P.2d 582, 586 (Ct. App. 1983).
217. Tafoya, 100 N.M. at 331, 670 P.2d at 585 (quoting Cook v. State, 521 P.2d 725 (Wash. 1974)). Tafoya
also stated that a child should "not be left to the whim or mercy of some self-constituted next friend to enforce its
rights." Id.; see also Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp., 692 P.2d 280, 286 (Ariz. 1984); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d
661, 667 (Tex. 1983) ("It is neither reasonable nor realistic to rely upon parents, who may.. .be ignorant, lethargic,
or lack concern, to bring... [the] action.").
218. Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 721-22 (Ohio 1986).
219. Barrio,692 P.2d at 286.
220. Rider, 1996-NMCA-090, 1 13, 923 P.2d at 608.
221. Id.1 11,923 P.2dat 607.
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In addition to this due process concern, the court in Rider expressed uncertainty
about the future of such a doctrine.222 The court stated concern about children being
left with no remedy223 or the only remedy being a suit for negligence against their
parent or guardian.224 One court has stated that this limited remedy could be
detrimental to the child's due process rights:225
[W]e find it unrealistic to expect that children would seek legal redress against
their parents as willingly as against the parties who are alleged to be medically
negligent. Placing young adults in a dilemma in which they must choose
between suing their parents or abandoning their claims has the practical effect
of chilling their due process rights.226
Also, if a child were able to later sue his or her parents for negligence in failing
to file the tort claim, this would create adversarial relationships between parents and
children and between siblings. The suit would inherently cause tension between the
two parties involved. Furthermore, if one child won a judgment against the parents
for a large sum of money, the obligation to pay could bankrupt the family or, at the
very least, deprive other siblings of financial support.
As illustrated above, courts and state legislatures face difficult policy concerns
when deciding whether to impose a burden on parents or guardians to file a tort suit
on their child's behalf. However, under the holdings of Jaramillo I and Jaramillo
II, the rule in New 227
Mexico is that parents do not have a duty to pursue a claim on
their child's behalf.
V. CONCLUSION
Children like Anthony Jaramillo are too young to have knowledge of the law and
cannot be expected to take legal action in pursuit of their own cause of action while
still mentally immature. Fortunately, by finding the New Mexico Tort Claims Act
and Medical Malpractice Act statutes of limitations unconstitutionally applied,
Jaramillo I and Jaramillo II offered Anthony, and presumably other minors like
him, the opportunity to protect their own legal interests.228 Unfortunately for minors,
the court did not find the statutes per se unconstitutional. The court also failed to
provide adequate guidance for determining when the statutes are unconstitutional.
Future courts and litigants will struggle to determine the constitutionality of the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act and the Medical Malpractice Act as applied to minors.

222. Id. It 13-14, 923 P.2d at 607-08.
223. Id. 14, 923 P.2d at 608.
224. Id.
225. Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 722 (Ohio 1986). Mominee addressed the issue of children
suing their parents. Id. Also, if parents and children are involved in a suit many years after the tort action, the stale
claims issue would still exist. Id.
226. Id.
227. Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Cr., 200 I-NMCA-024, 5,23 P.3d 931,
932; Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, l 17-18, 100 P.3d 204, 209.
228. See Jaramillo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M. Health & Scis. Ctr., 2001 -NMCA-024, 23 P.3d 931;
Jaramillo v. Heaton, 2004-NMCA-123, 100 P.3d 204,

